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In his path-breaking book, Imperfect Alternatives (1997), Neil Komesar develops a simple model for 
comparing the ability of institutions to address various social problems - for example the relative 
ability of markets versus legislatures versus courts to resolve a particular issue_ Beyond informing 
questions about institutional choice, Komesar's model can also be used to troubleshoot processes 
within single institutions - for example by exposing unnecessary impediments to citizen engagement 
in democratic processes. His model thus provides a tool that is useful for institutional analysis and 
reform, regardless of whether the goal is to improve a particular institutional approach or to think more 
broadly about larger comparative institutional capabilities_ 
Komesar's model is grounded in the basic idea that affected groups will participate on a given issue 
when that group's benefits, measured as the group's average per capita stakes, exceed their costs, 
which include the costs of information and organizing . The best institution typically is the one that 
brings out the most d iverse views. On issues of civil rights, for example the best institut ion allows the 
full spectrum of views to surface and be heard - not just the tyranny of the majority who may favor 
oppression of certain minorities. On issues of environmental pollution, the best institution considers 
not only the noisy demands of a small group of regulated parties, but also the interests of the often 
dormant majority. The model assesses how well institutions maximize the full range of partic ipation 
and compares this capability across institutional alternatives. 
In an essay published in a symposium issue of the Wisconsin Law Review honoring Komesar's work, 
I apply this model to administrative law. Since pluralistic oversight is one of the primary mechanisms 
for ensuring that th is fourth branch of federal program remains accountable to cit izens, administrative 
process makes the participation-centered model's central measure of maximizing balanced 
participation both relevant and concrete. Beyond spotlighting the central objective of administrative 
process, the participation-centered model also provides a tool for measuring how well the process is 
meeting this goal. The model's variables, coupled with the admonition that all affected groups should 
be engaged vigorously and in a balanced way, provides an empirically testable measure of the 
adequacy of a process. 
Using the central variables of Komesar's formula - the cost of information, the cost of access, and the 
benefits to interest groups - I assess how well administrative processes are doing in ensuring diverse 
engagement The preliminary application of Komesar's model reveals potentially significant structural 
problems that may ultimately be impeding rather than enhancing engagement by all affected 
interests_ A few of these discoveries are highlighted below_ 
Problem #1: Processing Costs are Ignored tllat Impede Balanced Participation 
Perhaps because it is so committed to sunlight, administrative law seems to assume that more 
information is better, but such a view fails to account for the partic ipatory impediments posed by 
information-processing costs. And, in administrative law these processing costs can significantly 
hamper partic ipation _ A typical, forty-plus page preamble and rule published in the Federal Register 
can demand dozens of hours of research and drafting time from a sawy public interest staffer who 
plans to submit a comment. If the staffer also reviews background information or comments fi led by 
others, the time spent to prepare comments on a rule easily doubles_ With hundreds of rules 
published annually just by EPA, the workload to submit comments on the environmenta l rules alone 
can far exceed a public interest group's capacity to participate in these processes. 
Worse still, administrative process may actively encourage parties, including the agency itself, to load 
superfluous information into the record, th us inflating information costs well beyond what is justified 
under the circumstances. For example, the courts have warned part1icipants that challenges to 
agency rules in court can occur only when the problems with a rule have been raised "with specificity" 
during notice and comment Commenters thus understand that they should attempt to create a 
record with every conceivable issue worthy of challenge_ Agencies' incentives for information loading 
run in parallel to those of interested parties. Courts review an agency's rule based in part on how well 
the agency responded to facts and related arguments raised by commentators. Like interested 
parties, agencies are encouraged to be overly thorough , to be exhaustive, and to leave no stone 
unturned. 
Problem #2: Invisible access points that make participation more costly 
While administrative process promises open access to decision makers and an opportunity for any 
citizen to comment and file suit on rules, in reality there are numerous invisible access points that are 
not open or easy for all affected participants to access cheaply . The first major access point that can 
serve in practice as a type of barrier to thinly-financed participants occurs during the development of 
the agency's proposal. During this often long and arduous period, the agency has judicially imposed 
incentives to get the proposal as complete as possible and to ensure that the most litigious groups 
are satisfied with the proposed rule. Early empirical evidence bears out that the squeaky wheels get 
the grease during th is pre-proposed stage_ An empirical study of some Clear A ir Act rules showed 
that regulated parties heavily dominated the pre-proposed rule process; on average there were 140 
agency contacts with the regulated parties per rule as opposed to less than one contact per rule with 
public interest groups during this same, formative rulemaking stage_ 
Another generally ignored access point that likely takes a toll on the balance and diversity of 
participants is White House review, or more spec ifically review by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Pursuant to an Executive Order first issued in 1981 by President Ronald 
Reagan, OIRA reviews significant rules at both the proposed and final stages. Because of their 
important role in altering the substance of some agency rules, OIRA has become an important access 
point for interest groups wishing to influence a regulation. Like the pre-NPRM process, OIRA 
meetings are more frequently held with regulated industry than with the public interest groups_ There 
is also preliminary empirical evidence that suggest that the effects of OIRA review tend to favor 
industry in the aggregate_ 
Political interference through congressional oversight hearings can also be used to bully agencies into 
revising their regulatory proposals or abandoning regulatory projects entirely. These legislative 
interventions create yet another access point that is costly to access but that can have a substantial 
influence on the final regu latory product. 
Finally, even judicial review can be used strategically. When an interest group files a petition seeking 
judicial review of an agency rule, the agency may choose to settle that petition, sometimes in secret if 
the terms of the settlement do not materially change the text of the rule. Ru le settlements thus 
constitute yet another access point that benefits those who file judicial challenges over those who do 
not. 
Problem #3: Artificially Reduced Benefits 
As the costs of information rise, the benefits to participate can become artificially depressed if a group 
is no longer able to comprehend what is ultimately at stake on a given issue. Bloated information 
costs thus further reduce the inclination of some participants to engage in the process, creating a 
double-whammy in ensuring full engagement by all affected interests. These artificially reduced 
benefits also occur in administrative process . For example , it can be particularly difficult for the 
catalytic public interest subgroups to activate the dormant majority to care about or, perlhaps more 
urgently, donate to issues that are so mired in complexity that they obscure what is at stake for the 
public in complicated but important environmental regulations_ 
Moving Forward 
Komesar's model allows researchers to see institutions in fresh ways. At least for some features of 
administrative process, this fresh look may reveal surprises that in turn demand the basic architecture 
of administrative law to be reconsidered. Using Komesar's formula, institutional process can then be 
redesigned in ways that lead to more balanced partic ipation in the future. 
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